1. Why does the interest rate rise after announcements of money growth?
One striking empirical regularity in recent years has been the tendency for interest rates to rise whenever the Federal Reserve Board announces an increase in the money supply greater than had previously been expected.
This relationship appears almost every week in credit market developments as reported in the financial press, and is borne out by Table 4 below.1 At first glance, the phenomenon might seem puzzling to a student of textbook IS-LM models, which predict that liquidity effects should make interest rates fall when the authorities expand the money supply. At second glance, however, the student should realize that there is not necessarily an inconsistency. Interest rates may indeed fall during a week in which the Fed increases the money supply. But when the announcement occurs ten days later, interest rates will change purely because the announcement alters the market's expectations of future monetary policy.
There is, in fact, an explanation of this weekly occurrence that is consistent with the Keynesian (IS-LM) view that tighter money causes the real interest rate to rise. Money growth that is faster than expected by the market is trpical1y faster than what was expected by the Fed as well.
Weekly blips in the money supply are unintended errors--due to fluctuations in private money demand or in the banking system--beyond the monetary authorities' control. The Fed subsequently corrects the errors to bring the money supply back in line with its target growth rates. Thus the announcement of a large money supply increase generates the expectation of future contraction in credit, and higher interest rates. In anticipation, interest rates jump on bonds with terms that include the period in which money markets will be tighter. The fact that rates on even very The Federal Reserve System may be forced to boost the discount rate from 12% in its battle to halt the soaring growth of the nation's money supply...Fears of Fed credit tightening sent the markets reeling Friday after release of the latest money supply statistics. Prices of long-term U.S. government bonds tumbled by more than a point, or $10 for each $1,000 face amount of securities. Interest rate increases of percentage point were common on short-term securities. (January 25, 1982) However, there is a second, very different, explanation of the phenomenon that, ironically, is propounded in the same newspaper, but in the editorial column. The announcement of rapid money growth causes the market to raise its estimate of the Fed's target money growth rate, the expected inflation rate rises, and it is reflected in a higher nominal interest rate.
A reduction in money growth will constrict the supply of credit, but it will also lower inflationary expectations. If the markets are convinced the Fed is really serious about slowing money growth, the drop in the inflationary premium will swamp the impact on the real rate of interest, and nominal rates will tall. This is precisely what seems to be happening this week in the wake of the latest money supply figures. (January 7, 1981) One might think of other ways of describing the positive correlation between money announcements and interest rate changes. But they can be seen to fall into the category of one or the other of these two competing 3 explanations, if one groups them by reference to the decomposition of the nominal interest rate into the real interest rate and the expected inflation rate. According to the first explanation, a large money announcement raises the nominal interest rate because it raises the real interest rate.
We will refer to this as the liquidity effect. According to the second explanation, the announcement raises the nominal interest rate because it raises expected inflation. We will refer to this as the inflation premium effect.
It would be useful to be able to distinguish between the two hypotheses, since they might give an indication of how the market views the Fed's policies. The liquidity effect requires that the market expect the Fed to stick to its pre-announced money growth target and to correct any aberration. The inflation premium explanation implies that the Fed is not trusted to keep a steady course; the market, like the Wall Street Journal editors, is ready to interpret any deviation in money growth as a signal that the Fed is changing its targets.
Fortunately, there is a quite simple way to choose between the two hypotheses. If expected inflation increases, then the value of the dollar should fall (the exchange rate should rise) as demand for the currency declines. On the other hand, if tight monetary policy causes the real interest rate to rise, then a capital inflow should cause an appreciation of the dollar. Thus, if the inflation premium view is correct, the exchange rate should have the same positive correlation with money announcements that the interest rate has. If the liquidity view is correct, the exchange rate should have the opposite correlation with the other variables.3 Section 2 of this paper formalizes the intuitive argument that the exchange rate depends on the expected future path of the money supply. The model is a generalization of Frankel's (1979) synthesis of Jacob Frenkel's (1976) monetarist version and Rudiger Dornbusch's (1976) Keynesian version, of the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. The reader familiar with this literature, or willing to accept the intuitive argument, is strongly encouraged to skip directly to the empirical results in Section 3. There, it is discovered that the evidence strongly favors the liquidity effect. We begin with a conventional money demand equation (1) -Pt
Here m and p are the logs of the money supply and price level, i is the very short-term interest rate and. a represents the influence of real income and other exogenous shifts in money demand.
In a flexible-price monetarist world, the combination of purchasing power parity in rate-of-change form and interest rate parity (equation (6) below) would tie the domestic interest rate to the foreign interest rate, with an allowance for expected inflation. Then the domestic price level Pt 5 would be determined by the money demand equation (1) and a money supply process.
We are going to allow prices to be sticky, to be prevented from jumping at a moment in time. Thus purchasing power parity does not hold in the short run. But prices adjust to excess demand over time, so purchasing power parity does hold in long-run equilibrium: (2) s=p, where s is the log of the equilibrium spot exchange rate, is the log of the domestic equilibrium price level, and the log of the foreign equilibrium price level is taken as exogenous and is here normalized at zero. The domestic equilibrium price level is in turn defined by the stable ("no bubble") rational expectations solution to
where Et+i -is the aquilibrium inflation rate expected at time t and i is the foreign interest rate, also taken to be exogenous. This is a logical way to determine p , because it is the way we would determine p in a flexible-price world.
We find the rational expectations solution as follows. Solve equation (3) for Pt in terms of Et+j . Then substitute the solution for in terms of Etpt+2 . Continuing to substitute recursively, we obtain
We see that p is an indicator of how expansionary the entire future path of money supply is expected to be relative to money demand. As an example, if money supply and demand are expected to be constant at m and a 6 respectively, then p is simply m -a + Xi . Below we will consider two alternative specific money supply processes to narrow down the range of possibilities under (4). Now we are going to see how changes in the unobservable are reflected as changes in the observable s . We assume a form of regressive expectations for the exchange rate:
In the long-run equilibrium, when s -= 0 , the spot rate s is of course expected to increase at the rate of the equilibrium spot rate s , which will be the same as the rates of increase of the equilibrium price level (by purchasing power parity) and money supply (by money demand homogeneity). But in the short run, if the spot rate exceeds what the market considers its equilibrium path (s -s < 0) , then the currency is thought to be "undervalued," and is expected in the future to appreciate (Es+i -
relative to the equilibrium path at a rate that is proportional to the gap.
(5) is of the general form that expectations are assumed to take in Frankel (1979) and Mussa (1977) . In our appendix it is shown to be precisely the rational form for expectations to take when the system contains an equation specifying the price level to adjust gradually according to an excess demand function plus a term for the equilibrium inflation path.
Our final assumption is uncovered interest partly:
Return to the money demand function (1) . An announcement of monetary growth at time t , as opposed to the event itself over the preceding period, does not change the money supply, or the price level or real money demand, and thus does not change the short-term interest rate i
Thus, by (6) If the announcement of an unexpectedly high money supply induces the public to raise its expectation of future money supplies relative to money demand, a sudden increase in s will tell us so.
On the other hand, if the announcement induces expectation of monetary contraction in the near future, a sudden fall in s will tell us so.
To make these two cases more concrete we now consider two particular alternative money supply processes. Both involve a target path for the money supply with growth rate
In both cases we also assume here that real money demand a follows a random walk; to get our results (qualitatively) it is sufficient that a be autocorrelated. (Recall that a includes real income.)
Under money supply process "A," the Fed succeeds in hitting its money supply target even on a weekly basis, but the Fed keeps changing the target growth rate according to a random walk:
If we use this money supply process in equation (4), we find that the announcement of a money supply 1% greater than expected raises by X% :6
Intuitively, under money supply process A , the announcement of m is interpreted as a one-for-one increase in the steady-state inflation rate, which reduces steady-state real money demand--or raises the equilibrium price level --by that amount times the semi-elasticity of money demand. From (8):
7 left-hand side of (5):
where we are using t' to denote the value of a variable the instant before the announcement.
We are interested in the change in the current spot rate induced by the announcement:
We use (2): (7) s -s,
The expression in brackets is the revision in the market's expected equilibrium inflation rate. The equilibrium money demand equation (3) tells us, with tn , i
, and a tied down, that the effect of the announcement on the market's expected equilibrium inflation rate is related to the effect on the equilibrium price level:
We combine (3') and (7): (8) s -s,
Equation (8) is the promised result that revisions in p , the indicator of expected future credit conditions, cause proportional jumps in the spot exchange rate. The equation is a generalization of Dornbusch's celebrated overshooting result that an unanticipated increase in the money supply causes an equilibrium increase in the exchange rate of the same percentage, and in addition causes the current exchange rate to overshoot its equilibrium by iiXB
We could stop here. Equation (4) In this case, the dollar appreciates with the announcement of an unexpectedly high money supply --the opposite from case A.
With either money supply process A or B, the nominal rate of interest would increase with a higher-than-anticipated money supply announcement.
However, with process A it would be the inflation premium that would rise, 
The announcement of an unexpectedly high money supply in this case causes an immediate depreciation of the dollar.
Under the alternative of money supply process "3", the Fed sticks to its pre-set target growth rate, but the actual money supply deviates from the target due to unintended weekly fluctuations (lOb) m tn + u
If we use this money supply process in equation (4), we find that the announcement of a money supply 1% greater than expected reduces Pt by X/(l+X)
Intuitively, under money supply process B, the announcement is interpreted as requiring a one-for-one contraction in the following period. It is true that the public has discovered the money supply in the most recent period to be higher than it had estimated. But it necessarily discovers at the same time that money demand at is higher than it had thought. Under our assumption that at is autocorrelated, the upward shift in money demand is expected to remain next period. But under our assumption of money supply process B, the money supply is anticipated to shift back next period. In expression (4) to a particular variable is that, after taking account of the information in the lagged forecast errors, the variable in question does not help predict the forecast error. Table 3 shows that neither the interest rate nor the exchange rate Granger-causes the monetary forecast error.
Having confirmed the desirable properties of the monetary forecasts, we now proceed to the main results of the paper. The results in Tables 4 and 5 cast error. The coefficient turns out to be negative, and highly significant.
So, on days when the money supply figures turn out to be greater than expected, the currency appreciates. This indicates that the real interest rate rises: the nominal interest rate rises because of liquidity effects, not because of the expected inflation premium.
Conclusion
The announcement phenomenon is a valuable tool for cutting through the web of simultaneous causality that plagues much of empirical macroeconomics. The negative effect that the announcements have on the exchange rate indicates that the market believes that the Fed has been following a steady money growth policy, at least since October 1979. When the money supply grows more rapidly than had been expected, the market assumes that the Fed will reverse the error in the future, not that it has raised its money growth target. The expectation of future tightening causes the interest rate to rise and the exchange rate to fall.
The results of this paper also shed light on a second issue. It is sometimes claimed that goods prices are flexible, and that fluctuations in the interest rate mostly consist of fluctuations in the expected inflation rate, rather than the fluctuations in the real interest rate that characterize a Keynesian model.1° In terms of the model developed in Section 2, the speed of adjustment O is th6ught to be close to infinite.
Changes in the nominal money supply or expected inflation rate are reflected immediately in the price level and real money supply, and thus have no effect on the real interest rate. One way people have tested this view of the world is to run a regression of the exchange rate against money (2):
This fo'rm of the price-adjustment equation is helpful in deriving the interest-rate relations.
We assume that the n-period ahead interest rate, nt , is simply the average of the expected one-period rates for the next n-periods.
From (A7): Substitute the uncovered interest parity relation (6) into the money demand function (1), and subtract (1) from (3):
Using long-run PPP (2):
From the expectations relation (5), and (Al), we have:
Leading (A2) one period, and taking expectations:
Subtracting (A2) from (A3) yields:
Using (Al) and (A4) and rearranging we have: the interest rate will move the same direction as the unexpected change in the money supply. In this case, the rise is entirely attributable to an increase in the inflation premium since:
For money supply process B, (Al5b) Etp -Etip
So, from (13b) and (All):
-
this model is also adequate to explain the observed movements of interest rates on days of monetary announcements. In this case, though, the nominal rate rises because of an increase in the real rate: 
So we get (A13) r -r,
Since (1 -0)fl -1 < 0 , the exchange rate always moves the opposite direction of the real rate of interest when new money stock figures are revealed.
Let be the inflation premium on n-period bonds:
A possible alternative solution to the problem is to abandon the re- Presumably the market has already used changes in the interest rate observed during the week to estimate money supply less money demand, with the breakdown (as to how much each is stimated to have changed) depending ra-tionally on the relative variance of the two. Still, the market gains a lot of information when the true money supply is announced. When it does, the revisions in its estimates of money supply and money demand must be equal.
7. The forecast error is the log of the actual announced money supply minus the log of the predicted money supply. Actually, Money Market Services, Inc., supplied predicted changes in the money supply. These figures were added to the current revised figures for the previous week, reported in the Federal
Reserve Bulletin, to get the predicted money supply.
8. In light of our finding that the survey data appear to be unbiased predictors of the actual money supply figures, one might be tempted to assume rationality of expectations, and to examine the actual money supply process directly. For example Pierce (1981) has found that the purely transitory component is responsible for a standard deviation of $3.3 billion in the weekly money supply figures. However, the existence of transitory deviations in the money supply is not sufficient to imply the announcement effect on interest races. We would also need positive autocorrelation in money demand innovations, as in the model of section 2 (or in the banking system innovations, as in footnote 2). Simultaneous estimation of money supply and demand equations might answer the question, but the technique used here is cleaner and easier.
9. The Federal Reserve Board changed its operating procedure on October 6, 1979, abandoning the use of interest rates as-a guide to intervention in money markets. The aim of this policy change, of course, was to enable it to hit its money growth targets in the future, an aim that it had often failed to achieve in the past, and to convince the market of its determina-26 
